An 87-year-old pensioner had her heart medication confiscated by security drones at Pearson Airport, her family claims, but it doesn’t exactly ring true. “Prescription medicine with a name that matches the passenger’s ticket, insulin and essential other non-prescription medicines are allowed,” says the GTAA press release, and the granny speaks naught but German, so all signs point to some kind of misunderstanding. But that’s beside the point. The family wins round one simply by virtue of this sentence, which concludes the CP’s report:
Although his mother was in “bad shape” when she got home Saturday morning, she was well enough yesterday to visit her husband’s grave, said Helmut Strohmeier.
Game, set and match.
Stories like this inevitably lead to a discussion of profiling. In the aftermath of the latest foiled terrorist plot in the UK, there was talk of racial or ethnic profiling finally being instituted at airports:
The Government is discussing with airport operators plans to introduce a screening system that allows security staff to focus on those passengers who pose the greatest risk.
The passenger-profiling technique involves selecting people who are behaving suspiciously, have an unusual travel pattern or, most controversially, have a certain ethnic or religious background.
The system would be much more sophisticated than simply picking out young men of Asian appearance. But it would cause outrage in the Muslim community because its members would be far more likely to be selected for extra checks.
There is so much misinformation there. Firstly, passengers are already profiled behaviorally, and have been for years. If you don’t believe me I suggest the following experiment: Take a couple of trips to Pakistan and back. Then rock up to the British Airways ticket desk at Pearson wearing a maniacal grin and buy a one-way first class ticket on a flight to London that leaves in 45 minutes — pay with non-sequential US 100-dollar bills, and check no luggage. Start looking over your shoulder, son. It won’t matter what your name is or what colour your skin is. They’re going to take a longer, harder look at you than at the average traveller.
Indeed, one of the great “arrrgh!” factors about the September 11 attacks is how many of the hijackers were flagged as potential risks: one (Mohammed Atta) in Portland, Maine; three in Boston; and five at Washington’s Dulles Airport (see pages 1-4 of the 9-11 Commission Report). That had nothing to do with racial profiling, as far as we know. Seven of those nine were identified by CAPPS (Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System), while two at Dulles struck check-in agents as suspicious. All that meant at the time was that the hijackers’ luggage wasn’t loaded onto the planes until they boarded, but it is worth noting that even somnambulist pre-9/11 airline security identified nearly half of the hijackers as less than ideal flyers.
Most new airline security measures are based on the principle, to paraphrase Tony Soprano, of putting shit back in the donkey. The 9/11 hijackers were armed with boxcutters, so now we can’t take anything sharp on a plane. (Perhaps this isn’t insanely overcautious, but it wasn’t the boxcutters that won the day. It was the now outmoded “no heroes” rules of engagement for dealing with hijackers. Atta and Co. would never be able to seize those planes today, boxcutters or no boxcutters.)
Then Richard Reid tried to blow up a plane with a shoe bomb, so now some airports make us take off our shoes when we go through security. The Brits foiled the alleged plot to combine liquids onboard an airplane to form a bomb, so now you can’t take orange juice on a plane. (But you can drink orange juice that’s given to you on board. Is OJ dangerous or isn’t it?) Faced with these genuine annoyances, and armed with the ostensibly controversial statement that “all terrorists are Muslims,” people get hung up on the idea that “racial” profiling is the path to security.
It isn’t. You can’t weed out 100 percent of the “Muslims” among the 1.8 million passengers a day who travel on American commercial airliners any more than you can weed out 100 percent of the people who believe Elvis is alive. Focus on people with Muslim-sounding names and you’ll miss Richard Reid. You’ll miss Germaine Lindsay. You’ll miss Steven Chand. The minute you start basing airline security on what passengers’ names sound like to western ears is the minute you give terrorists a whole new recruitment strategy.
It’s not just vigilance that has kept terrorists off airplanes since 9/11 — it’s the fact that terrorists are too stupid to get past current security measures. To quote from the 9/11 Report:
In another Logan terminal, Shehhi, joined by Fayez Banihammad, Mohand al Shehri, Ahmed al Ghamdi, and Hamza al Ghamdi, checked in for United Airlines Flight 175, also bound for Los Angeles. A couple of Shehhi’s colleagues were obviously unused to travel; according to the United ticket agent, they had trouble understanding the standard security questions, and she had to go over them slowly until they gave the routine, reassuring answers.
I mean, come on. Terrorists share many common factors other than their religion — ones they can’t compensate for with name changes and the recruitment of non-Arabs. Only by focusing on those factors can we be confident in our security measures. In the meantime, it should not be problematic to rule out diabetic 89-year-old German grandmothers with serious heart conditions as serious threats.